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This paper uses simple regression techniques to make an initial assessment of the 
monetary damages caused by the January 12, 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti. 
Damages are estimated for a disaster with both 200,000 and 250,000 total dead 
and missing (i.e., the range of mortality that the earthquake is estimated to have 
caused) using Haiti’s economic and demographic data. The base estimate is 
US$8.1bn for a death toll of 250,000, but for several reasons this may be a lower- 
bound estimate. An estimate of US$13.9bn for the same death toll is within 
statistical error. While the results are subject to many caveats, the implications of 
such an estimate are significant. Raising such a figure will require many donors—
bilateral, multilateral and private. Hence excellent coordination of funding and 
execution will be the key to ensuring the efficient use of funds.   
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1 The authors are affiliated with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): Cavallo and Becerra are in the 
Research Department (RES); Powell is the Regional Economic Advisor for the Caribbean Department (CCB). 
However, the opinions expressed in this paper are strictly are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the IDB, its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The authors wish to thank Ilan 
Noy for useful comments. All remaining errors are our own responsibility. 1.  Introduction 
 
We use simple regression techniques to assess the estimated direct cost of the catastrophic 
earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010. The earthquake, which hit about 15km (10 
miles) southwest of the capital city Port-au-Prince, was followed by several strong aftershocks 
and has caused significant loss of human life, the displacement of hundreds of thousands and 
severe damage to the country’s economic infrastructure.   
In order to estimate the monetary damages caused by this event, we combine worldwide 
data from about 2,000 natural catastrophic events between 1970 and 2008. We model the dollar 
amount of damage of each event as a function of the number of dead or missing, the level of 
economic development (real GDP per capita), country size (alternatively measured as population 
size, real GDP or land area), regional dummies, and a linear trend. Using these regression results 
we make out-of-sample predictions regarding the estimated dollar amount of damages that can 
be expected for a country with Haiti’s economic and demographic characteristics in the 
aftermath of the catastrophic earthquake of January 12.  
The unit of observation is an event as recorded in the Emergency Events Database (EM-
DAT) maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the 
Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium (http://www.emdat.be/). The database is compiled from 
various sources, including various UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance 
companies, research institutions, and press agencies. Disasters can be hydro-meteorological, 
including floods, wave surges, storms, droughts, landslides and avalanches; geophysical, 
including earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions; and biological, including epidemics and 
insect infestations (these are much more infrequent in this database). There are approximately 
2,000 such events recorded in the dataset in the 1970-2008 period, for which we also have all the 
necessary information to conduct the empirical analysis.
2 The direct damage reported in EM-
DAT is damage to fixed assets and capital (including inventories), damages to raw materials and 
extractable natural resources, and mortality and morbidity that are a direct consequence of the 
natural phenomenon recorded.   
The nature of the exercise we perform is simple. It uses historical data on catastrophic 
events and econometric techniques to answer the following question: what are the expected costs 
                                                           
2 We focus primarily on the three types of disasters which are more common and for which there is more reliable 
data available in the dataset: earthquakes (including tsunamis), floods and windstorms.     
2 
 of rebuilding Haiti’s infrastructure?
3  Damages are estimated for a disaster with both 200,000 
and 250,000 total dead and missing (i.e., the range of mortality that is estimated to have caused 
the earthquake) and using Haiti’s economic and demographic data. The bottom line is that for a 
disaster with 200,000 total dead and missing, in a country with Haiti’s observable characteristics, 
damages are expected to be about US$7.2bn (2009 dollars). For a death toll of 250,000 the 
estimate would be US$8.1bn.  Intermediate numbers give intermediate results. Unfortunately, 
recent estimates place the actual death toll at the top of this range. Nonetheless, the errors 
attached to these estimates (obtained via bootstrapping) remain quite large, in part because there 
are relatively few disasters of this size: while the base estimate may be as high as US$8.1bn for 
250,000 deaths, an estimate of US$13.9bn is within statistical error. 
These estimates are useful for putting this event into perspective and informing the 
international community of the enormity of the challenge that lies ahead in the task of 
reconstructing Haiti.  However, several caveats are in order. Given the nature of the exercise, the 
results should be interpreted with caution. First, there are conceivably measurement errors in the 
data, and the model we postulate may be incorrectly specified. Other problems with the empirics 
may also exist.  Second, we cannot know if the experience of past episodes around the world will 
be relevant for Haiti. Every event is different and, although we control for country and regional-
specific characteristics in the regressions, we could have missed one or more important issues.  
This concern is compounded by the fact that the characteristics of this particular event are quite 
special: it is the most destructive event a country has ever experienced when measured in terms 
of the number of people killed as a share of the country’s population
4 (see Table 1), and it has 
affected the capital city of the country: the center of commerce, government and communication. 
Moreover, while many priceless buildings were destroyed or severely damaged, including the 
Presidential Palace, the National Cathedral, churches and Government Buildings, it has not been 
possible to control for this in the estimation. Finally, as with any empirical exercise of this 
nature, the estimates are subject to statistical uncertainty and, as detailed, there are few events of 
such ferocity as the Haiti 2010 earthquake. 
                                                           
3 Note that this assumes infrastructure is rebuilt—i.e., this is not then a Needs Assessment which may contemplate 
building different infrastructure or infrastructure in different places according to a revised development strategy—
and we focus here on the more traditional damage assessment.   
4 For example, while the ballpark estimates of the number of people killed or missing are similar to the 2004 tsunami 
in Indonesia, the population of Haiti is only a small fraction of the one of the Asian country, making this particular 
event more damaging in relative terms than that infamous tsunami.  
3 
 Table 1. Large Natural Disasters 
Haiti 2010 Earthquake 200,000 - 250,000 20,000 - 25,000 7,200 - 8,100
1 Nicaragua 1972 Earthquake 10,000 4,046 4,325
2 Guatemala 1976 Earthquake 23,000 3,707 3,725
3 Myanmar 2008 Cyclone Nargis 138,366 2,836 4,113
4 Honduras 1974 Cyclone Fifi 8,000 2,733 2,263
5 Honduras 1998 Cyclone Mitch 14,600 2,506 5,020
6S r i  Lanka 2004 Tsunami* 35,405 1,839 1,494
7 Venezuela 1999 Flood 30,005 1,282 4,072
8 Bangladesh 1991 Cyclone Gorki 139,252 1,232 3,038
9 Solomon Is 1975 Tsunami 200 1,076 n.a.






Rank Country Year Description People killed




The structure of this paper is as follows: the next section discusses the empirical model 
and other methodological issues. Section 3 presents the regression results, and Section 4 presents 
the out-of-sample predictions for Haiti. Section 5 provides a policy discussion, and Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2.  Model Specification and Methodology 
 
Following the literature
5 we estimate a model of the form: 
 
it it it DIS α βε = ++ X   (1) 
 
where   is a measure of dollar amount of direct damages caused by the immediate impact of 
a disaster in country i at time t. For comparability purposes, all data are converted into 2009 US 
dollars using the United States’ Consumer Price Index (CPI).   is a vector of control variables 
of interest that capture the “vulnerability” of the country to disasters (i.e., the conditions which 
increase the susceptibility of a country to the impact of natural hazards) and countries’ 
demographic characteristics.  
it DIS
it X
it ε  is an independent and identically distributed (iid) error term. 
We first estimate the model for the full sample of events available in the dataset over the 
timeframe 1970-2008. Next, we use the coefficient estimates  and   to predict out of sample 
the dollar amount of direct damages for the recent earthquake in Haiti. In other words, we 
replace   in (1) with    and use the coefficient estimates from the model to provide an  t i, X 2010 , Haiti X
                                                           
5 See, for example, Kahn (2005), Skidmore and Toya (2007), Cavallo and Noy (2009) and references therein. 
4 
 estimate for  . Finally, we use bootstrapping simulation methods to determine the 
confidence intervals around these predictions.  
2010 , Haiti DIS
                  
We initially pool all types of events (approximately 2,000 events with full data) and 
compute pooled regressions. However, we alternatively compute the model for three different 
types of events separately: (a) earthquakes, (b) windstorms, and (c) floods.  When we do so, we 
augment the set of controls to include measures of the physical intensities of events (i.e., Richter 
scale for earthquakes or wind speed for hurricanes).  
One problem with the disaster data in the EM-DAT database should be noted at this 
point. As the threshold used to assess what events constitute a natural disaster is quite lenient, 
there are many events recorded in the dataset that are not conceivably catastrophic.
6 To avoid 
overrepresentation of small events in the sample (which may not be relevant for the case of 
Haiti) and to obtain a parsimonious representation, we exclude approximately 250 very small 
events, defined as those with fewer than 10 people reported dead or missing and for which 
reported damages are less than US$10 million.
7 
 
3.  Regression Results 
 
The regression results for the pooled model are presented in Table 2. The estimation method is 
OLS and the preferred regression is in logarithms.  The dependent variable is direct damage in 
US$ of 2009.  The baseline specification includes a control for the intensity of the event in terms 
of mortality (number of people killed or missing), the stage of economic development (lagged 
real GDP per capita), and country size. For the latter we use either population size (column 1), 
land area in km
2 (column 2) or lagged real GDP (column 3).
8 All regressions include a linear 
trend, as some of the increases in reported damages over time may be due to improvements in 
recording capacity or data availability, as well as regional dummies (not reported) to account for 
                                          
6 EM-DAT defines a disaster as a natural situation or event which overwhelms local capacity and/or necessitates a 
request for external assistance. For a disaster to be entered into the EM-DAT database, at least one of the following 
criteria must be met: (1) 10 or more people are reported killed; (2) 100 people are reported affected; (3) a state of 
emergency is declared; or (4) a call for international assistance is issued. See Cavallo and Noy (2009) for a 
discussion. 
7 Including these events, we obtain even higher estimates of the damage.  
8 GDP measures are lagged to reduce possible endogeneity problems. 
5 
 possible heterogeneity across regions in the incidence of the various events. Finally, in column 4 
we also include a dummy for the type of event (earthquakes is the excluded variable).
9 
 
Table 2. Baseline Regressions 
Disasters regression model. Dependent variable: Log of Damages (2009 US$, bn)
Sample: 1971 ‐ 2008
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
Number of people killed (in logs) 0.529 0.537 0.533 0.526
[20.36]*** [21.08]*** [20.93]*** [20.22]***
Real GDP per capita (first lag, in logs) 0.501 0.499 0.356 0.485











linear trend 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005
[0.68] [1.29] [0.72] [0.98]
Constant ‐11.050 ‐9.823 ‐11.070 ‐10.980
[‐19.49]*** [‐21.95]*** [‐19.65]*** [‐18.74]***
R‐squared 0.388 0.388 0.394 0.392
Adjusted R‐squared 0.383 0.383 0.389 0.387









The fit of the regressions is good with an adjusted R-squared of approximately 0.4. The 
estimated damages increase significantly with the intensity of the event, with the level of 
economic development (in richer countries there is more wealth exposed to the disasters) and 
with country size (bigger countries also have more wealth exposed). In terms of the type of 
                                                           
9 The inclusion of additional control variables, such as level of educational attainment, openness to trade, financial 
development and the size of government do not significantly change the baseline results (details available upon 
request). The most likely reason is that some of these variables are known to be highly correlated with economic 
development.  
6 
 events (column 4), earthquakes appear to be more destructive than floods, but not more 
destructive than storms.  The linear trend is not statistically significant.
10 The results are intuitive, 
with the possible exception of the positive sign of real GDP per capita, which appears to be at 
odds with previous results by Khan (2005) and Skidmore and Toya (2007). Both of these papers 
use similar methods to examine the relationship between human and economic losses from 
natural disasters and economic development, and both find that countries with higher income per 
capita experience fewer losses. This in turn is interpreted as meaning that economic development 
provides implicit insurance against natural disasters. The results are not directly comparable, 
however, because—in contrast with the papers cited—we use the number of people killed as a 
right-hand side (explanatory) variable. In other words, in this paper, rather than focusing on the 
relationship between human mortality and economic development, we look at the relationship 
between mortality and economic development with monetary losses.  
These results are also robust to the exclusion of events in industrialized countries. This is 
shown in Table 3, which has the same regressions excluding industrial countries. The coefficient 
estimates remain virtually unchanged, with the sole exception of the dummy for floods in 
column (4), suggesting that for the sample of developing countries only there is no statistically 
significant difference in the damage caused by earthquakes and floods.  
                                                           
10 Its exclusion from the regressions does not change the results. 
7 
 Table 3. Baseline Regressions with Developing Countries Only 
Disasters regression model. Dependent variable: Log of Damages (2009 US$, bn)
Sample: 1971 ‐ 2008
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Number of people killed (in logs) 0.493 0.503 0.501 0.495
[16.79]*** [17.54]*** [17.42]*** [16.76]***
Real GDP per capita (first lag, in logs) 0.444 0.441 0.280 0.436











linear trend ‐0.003 0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.001
[‐0.46] [0.22] [‐0.41] [‐0.25]
Constant ‐10.720 ‐9.457 ‐10.740 ‐10.830
[‐15.35]*** [‐17.41]*** [‐15.65]*** [‐15.01]***
R‐squared 0.323 0.329 0.333 0.326
Adjusted R‐squared 0.317 0.322 0.327 0.318








Next, we recomputed the regressions separating by event types. When doing so, we can 
also control for the physical intensity of earthquakes (Richter scale) and windstorms (wind 
speed). The results are presented in Table 4.
11  
                                                           
11 We include the Richter scale in levels as, by definition, it is expressed in a logarithmic scale. For instance, an 
earthquake of 7.0 on the scale releases about 31 times more energy than an earthquake of 6.0. However, magnitude 
itself may not explain the damages caused by an earthquake. For example, earthquakes with lower magnitudes could 
be more destructive if they are located near densely populated areas.  
8 
 Table 4. Baseline Regressions by Event Type 
Disasters regression model. Dependent variable: Log of Damages (2009 US$, bn)
Sample: 1971 ‐ 2008





Number of people killed (in logs) 0.529 0.657 0.473 0.597
[20.36]*** [11.27]*** [6.74]*** [11.98]***
Real GDP per capita (first lag, in logs) 0.501 0.572 0.493 0.527
[11.58]*** [3.95]*** [4.36]*** [5.99]***
Population (in logs) 0.147 ‐0.143 0.150 0.279
[5.08]*** [‐0.95] [2.47]** [4.95]***
linear trend 0.003 0.043 ‐0.032 0.003
[0.68] [2.62]*** [‐1.90]* [0.43]
Constant ‐11.050 ‐5.673 ‐13.210 ‐14.450
[‐19.49]*** [‐1.84]* [‐5.71]*** [‐12.89]***
R‐squared 0.388 0.569 0.521 0.339
Adjusted R‐squared 0.383 0.531 0.485 0.327









The results are also consistent with the baseline. The only exceptions are that the linear 
trend is positive and significant in the case of earthquakes (suggesting that earthquakes have 
become more damaging over time) and negative and significant for storms (suggesting that 
storms have become less damaging). These results may not be surprising, as earthquakes are by 
their nature less predictable, and the exact location where they may strike is usually unknowable. 
Therefore, while it is possible to implement building codes and standards that better prepare 
infrastructure to resist possible earthquakes, it is not easy to locate wealth in “safer” areas. In 
contrast, climatologic events like hurricanes disproportionately affect certain regions, 
particularly coastal locations in tropical areas. Vulnerable countries may therefore choose to 
locate their wealth away from the most exposed areas.
12  
                                                           
12 However, this does is not always the case. For example, Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) suggest a nuanced, 
nonlinear relationship between economic development and vulnerability to natural disasters, with risk initially 
increasing with higher incomes as a result of changing behaviors, such as residents locating to more desirable but 
more dangerous sites near coasts and floodplains. Sadowski and Sutter (2005) provide some confirmation for this 
9 
 Interestingly, the results in Table 4 suggest that the physical intensity of earthquakes does 
not affect the amount of damages (controlling for the number of people killed), while in the case 
of storms, wind speed has a significant independent effect on damages. This suggests that the 
number of people killed in earthquakes may be more correlated to the physical intensity of the 
event than in the case of windstorms.  
 
4.  Out-of-Sample Prediction for Haiti 
 
The next step is to use the regression results to predict the damages caused by the devastating 
earthquake that hit in Haiti on January 12, 2010. The earthquake, which registered 7.0 on the 
Richter scale, struck very close to the capital city of Port-au-Prince, causing extensive casualties 
and huge damages to private and public assets.  It should be noted that Haiti is already the 
poorest country in the Latin America and the Caribbean region and ranks in the bottom quartile 
of the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index.  
To estimate the overall damages caused by the earthquake in a country with Haiti’s 
economic and demographic characteristics, we use the coefficient estimates from the baseline 
regressions, replacing matrix   in (1) with  . Table 5 summarizes the elements of  
 that are relevant for the estimation. 
t i, X 2010 , Haiti X
2010 , Haiti X
 






















                                                                                                                                                                                           
view by examining hurricanes in the United States and the ways in which better preparedness leads to higher 
residential coastal concentrations (where the risk from hurricane-associated wave surges is higher). 
10 
 The estimates of the number of people killed are still subject to extensive discussion and 
revision. At the time of writing, estimates range anywhere between 200,000 and 250,000, 
including missing persons.  As of February 10 2010, the official estimate of the government of 
Haiti was a total of 230,000 people dead (not including missing). Figure 1 shows the estimated 
damage (y-axis) plotted against the death toll (x-axis) with confidence intervals computed using 
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Reported Haiti estimates CI (90%)
Source: Authors' calculations based on EM-DAT and WDI datasets.
Full sample regression. 1971-2008
Estimated Damages for Natural Disasters
 
 
The results of the estimates indicate that, for an earthquake that causes 200,000 deaths in 
a country with Haiti’s observable characteristics, the estimated damage is US$7.2bn, with 90 
percent confidence intervals between US$4.1bn and US$12.2bn. If the death toll were to reach 
250,000, the estimated damage is US$8.1bn, with 90 percent confidence intervals between 
US$4.6bn and US$13.9bn. Intermediate numbers give intermediate results. For example, using 
the official death toll of 230,000 as of February 10, the estimated damage is US$7.7bn, with 90 
percent confidence intervals between US$4.4bn and US$13.2bn.    
These estimates are based on the regression results using model (1.1) in Table 2. Table 6 
below summarizes the results we obtain using regressions (1.2) and (1.3) in that table. 
11 
 Table 6. Confidence Intervals 
Point estimate Lower CI Upper CI Point estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Regression (1.1) 7.2 4.1 12.2 8.1 4.6 13.9
Regression (1.2) 7.7 4.3 13.2 8.6 4.8 14.7









Figure 2 shows the partial correlation scatter plot between the log of US$ damages (y-
axis) and the log of total number of people killed (x-axis). This figure (based on model 1.1 in 
Table 2) illustrates the strength of the relationship between the two variables after conditioning 
on the other explanatory variables included in the regression.  Furthermore, it shows that while 
the event in Haiti is indeed very large, even after accounting for the observable characteristics we 
control for in the regressions, the results do not appear to be driven by outliers.
13 
 
                                                           
13 Moreover, it can be observed from Figure 2 that once we condition on the other explanatory variables included in 
the regressions, the relationship between economic damages and the number of people killed is much more 
parsimonious that what can be inferred from the unconditioned correlation (Figure 1).  
12 
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5.  Implications of the Results 
 
These results hold significant implications for both Haiti and the international community.   
While a detailed assessment of needs will come from the so-called Post Disaster Needs 
Assessment that will be conducted in the coming months, the estimates above indicate that 
Haiti’s needs will total several  billion dollars.  This sum, moreover, will be beyond the scope of 
any one agency or bilateral donor, making donor coordination key in any reconstruction effort.  
Bobba and Powell (2006), for example, argue that aid is more effective when fewer donors are 
present, and multilateral organizations may thus be seen as a coordinating tool.  Among possible 
approaches to coordination, one extreme is an all-encompassing, general-purpose and multi-
donor trust fund managed by a single agency.  It may be more feasible, though, to have several 
“aggregator” funds, perhaps organized on thematic lines.  However the coordination of the 
funding is achieved, it will be critical to ensure donors are coordinated on the ground.  A single 
executing agency with appropriate powers, transparency and accountability to the Haitian 
Government and donors would be helpful in this regard.  While one view is that aid will be 
constrained by the capacity of institutions in Haiti to manage and execute the projects to be 
13 
 financed, this constraint may be endogenous to the architecture of funding and execution that 
donors and the Haitian Government find acceptable.  Moreover, coordination and execution 
structures may also serve to ensure that aid is used most efficiently for Haiti rather than favoring 
particular projects favored by donors or tied in any way, such as conditions to employ firms from 
any particular donor country.   
Academic work suggests that the impact of such disasters such as the Haitian earthquake 
is very persistent.  Cavallo et al. (2010) estimate that, even 10 years after a major disaster, the 
affected country’s growth may be some 30 percent lower than it would have been otherwise.   
This is the case even given the significant increases in aid flows that tend to occur after a major 
disaster.  Of course, this does not necessarily mean that aid does not work, as the negative 
growth effect would have been even worse if aid had not increased.  However, this does 
underline the challenge ahead for Haiti and for the international community in its attempt to 
support the country. 
One concern is that large aid inflows may provoke cost increases, real appreciation and 
Dutch Disease, increasing aid-dependence and damaging private sector activity not directly 
related to reconstruction, including the export sector.   In the case of Haiti, exports are small 
(some 10 percent of GDP), but they were growing (at an annual rate of 12 percent in 2009) and 
are highly concentrated in assembly industries including garments (some 90 percent of exports 
are assembly goods).  The US Hope II legislation gives Haiti unparalleled access to US markets 
with generous “origin rules” for garments and other selected activities, and there has been 
increasing interest from foreign firms in employing workers in Haiti for assembly and other 
activities.  Given the growth effects of natural disasters and the macroeconomic management 
issues of large aid flows, it appears important to ensure that the potential for job creation and 
growth in these sectors is not put at risk.  Other potential growth areas for exports include high-
value agricultural goods such as mangos (also useful for reforestation to resist soil degradation) 
and tourism, sectors whose support merits serious consideration.     
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this short paper we have attempted to give a preliminary estimate of the potential damages 
resulting from the tragedy of the January 12 Haiti earthquake.   Our estimate derives from simple 
regression techniques employing data on past natural disasters and their damages estimates.  Our 
14 
 base estimate is US$8.1bn for a 250,000 death toll.  We suspect for several reasons that this is a 
lower-bound estimate, and an estimate of US$13.9bn for the same death toll is within statistical 
error. 
The implications of such an estimate are significant.  Raising such a figure will require 
many donors, bilateral, multilateral and private.  Hence excellent coordination of funding and of 
execution will be the key to ensuring the efficient use of funds.  This is likely to imply that 
individual donors will have to relinquish control of their donations in terms of which projects 
they fund and the precise execution conditions, which in turn implies that appropriate 
mechanisms of transparency and accountability will be very important.  Unfortunately, past 
experience suggests that, despite higher aid inflows after disasters, the growth impact of major 
disasters remains highly persistent.  Apart from potential inefficiencies of the management of aid 
flows, microeconomic bottlenecks and a macroeconomic Dutch Disease-type phenomenon may 
hurt private activity not directly related to reconstruction.  While Haiti’s export sector is very 
small, it does have significant growth potential. The international community will need to 
consider how best to support private activities to ensure the negative growth impact is minimized 
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